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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN W. SPENCER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 8538

vs.
L. C. CROWTHER, et al,
Defendant and Respondent,

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was a member of the Salt Lake City
Police Department from October, 1938, to and including June 1, 1951 (R. 68). On the Iatter date
he was discharged by order of the Chief of Police,
L. C. Crowther. The reason assigned for appellant's
removal from the police payroll was that he was
not at that time a bona fide resident of Salt Lake
City living with his family within the City. ( Def's.
Exh. 11).
Police officers of Salt Lake City had been
1
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given notice dated April 24, 1950, that after thirty
days from that date every officer not living within
Salt Lake City would be suspended, (Def's. Exh. 8).
At the time of the issuance of this notice appellant
was residing in Salt Lake County ( R. 69).
After receiving notice, appellant obtained a
room within Salt Lake City at 364 East Sixth South
( R. 74). Appellant subsequently maintained a room
with his brother at the Fairmont Appartments in
Salt Lake City (R. 75) and later maintained a room
at the home of Mrs. Irma Finch at 823 Elm Avenue,
Salt Lake City (R. 76). Appellant maintained a
room at the last address until two weeks after his
discharge ( R. 76) .
It is undisputed that during the time he maintained these rooms his wife and son continued to
reside at 2111 Walker's Lane in Salt Lake County
(R. 77). After appellant's discharge he moved back
to 2111 Walker's Lane, where he remained until
July 1, 1952, when he moved to 2731 Fillmore
Street, Salt Lake City, which was his address and
residence at the time of trial (R. 78).
Within five days of his discharge appellant
appealed to the CiYil Service Co1nn1ission of Salt
Lake City, and in Noven1ber of 1951 he was advised by letter from the Civil Service Commission
that the Commission would not hear the appeal because it had no jurisdiction (Plntf's Exh. 12).
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Thereafter appellant filed this action, which was
tried March 27, 1956, and he appea1s to this Court
from the adverse judg.ment entered at the trial.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1.
·,.
.
'

r

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND
CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT A RESIDENT OF SALT LAKE CITY AT THE TIME OF HIS
REMOVAL FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT.
POINT 2.
THE COURT ERRED IN HIS CONCLUSION OF
LAW THAT APPELLANT WAS LAWFULLY DISMISSED FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT.

ARGUMENT
The two points here relied upon by the appellant are actually co,ncomitant parts of the error
alleged to have been committed by the trial judge
and will be here argued together.
This appeal is entirely a rna tter of analyzing
and applying statutory sections to the facts introduced at the trial. Two sections of the statutes
should be examined. The first is Sec. 10-6-6, U. C.A.
1953, which reads as follows:
"E1igibility of Officers: All elective officers of cities and of towns shall be chosen by
the qualified voters of their respective municipalities. No person shall be eligible to any
office, elective or appointive, who is not a
qualified elector of the city or town, nor shall
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any person be eligible to any office who is a
~
defaulter to the corporation."
'The other is Sec. 20-2-13 and reads as follows:
"A 'Resident' Defined: A resident within the meaning of this title is a person who
has resided or will have resided continuously
within this state for one year, and in the
county four months, and in the precinct sixty
days, next preceding the day of the next ensuing election.''
The whole question to be decided is whether
appellant was or was not a resident of Salt Lake
City within the meaning of these sections.
Appellant of course contends that he was, and
the only evidence presented leads necessarily to such
a finding and conclusion and the trial judge was in •
error when he found otherwise.
Appellant's testimony shows he was living in
Salt Lake County when advised by the Chief of
Police that he would have to move into Salt Lake :~
City (R. 69). What he did then is clear. Appellant J
made arrangements to move and establish his residence in Salt Lake City.
Appellant consulted the corporation counsel of
Salt Lake City about the requirements for establishing re~idence in Salt Lake City ( R. 71). He was )I
told, and rightly so, as a result of this conversation
that place of residence is a matter of intention and
may be established upon that basis and without any
4
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necessary reference to the time involved. It is therefore appellant's contention that he moved into Salt
Lake City with the intent to establish his residence
therein and that he did so.
The next consideration is whether appe1lant
complied with that provision of Sec. 10-6-6 of U.C.A.
1953,. which required him to be a qualified elector
of the City of Salt Lake.
The record is clear that the appellant was registered in voting district No. 68 in Salt Lake City
during the years 1942, 1944, 1946 and 1948 (Plntf's.
Exh. 1, R. 75-76). Appellant changed his registration in 1950 to Salt Lake City voting District No.
224, which includes the Fairmont Apartments where
he was living at that time (Plntf's Exh. 1, R. 7576) . His testimony is that he voted in District No.
224 in 1950 (R. 76).
It seems apparent, therefore, that he was in
compliance with the requirements of Sec. 10-6-6
above referred to.
It should further be noted that Chief Odes B.
Record made an investigation to determine where
the appellant's residence was (R. 131-132). The investigation was conducted after the discharge of the
appellant and was cursory and incomplete.
On cross-examination of Chief Record the following questions and answers about his investigation resulted (R. 132-133-134):
5
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"BY MR. ALLEN:
Q. Chief, you have testified about an
investigation that you and Captain Haight
made. Was all of the investigation you made
on behalf of the Chief conducted after June
1st, 1951?
A, Yes, it was.
Q. And you conducted your own investigation with respect to his residence, or where
he was living, prior to that time?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. So to your knowledge you don't have
information with respect to where he was living before the Chief asked you to conduct
that investigation?
A. No.
Q. Did you do anything out on Walker
Lane except observe the mail box?
A. We went out and checked out there
and there was just his name on the mail box.
We also checked the school to find out if his
boy was going to school at the Cottonwood
School.
Q. At that time, did you talk with anybody at the place on Walker Lane?
A. No.
Q. And you conducted no investigation
in Salt Lake at the Fairmont Apartments?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you do at the Fairn1ont
Apartments?
6
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A. We talked to a Mr. Smith, who I
believe he said was the manager of the a partments, and asked him about Mr. Spencer,
John Spencer, and he said he had a Clyde
Spencer living there and knew of no other
Spencer living in the apartment.
Q. You didn't ever go to Clyde Spencer's
apartment, did you?
A. He wasn't there when we made the
investigation. He moved from there prior to
that time.
Q. Did you ever talk with Mrs. Finch
out on Elm Avenue?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you talk with her?
A. The same day. We made all three
of them the same day, right after the first of
June, the first week of June, 1951.
Q. Did you ascertain from talking with
her that he had been living there for some
time?
A. She told us he lived there and had
a bedroom. She took us back and showed us
the bedroom he was supposed to be renting
from her.
Q. Did you talk with any of the neighbors out there on Elm Avenue?
A. It seems to me like we did talk to
some lady out watering her lawn and I think
she said, "I don't pay any attention to my
neighbors who come and go, 'but I don't know
who it was but it was some lady watering
the lawn next door east.'
7
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Q. In connection with the investigation
you were requested to make, Chief, did you
ever talk to the Plaintiff John Spencer about
il?
'
'
A.

I don't believe I ever did."

It seems obvious that this investigation contributed absolutely nothing as to the residence status
of the appellant before he was discharged.
From the foregoing the plaintiff contends that
Finding No. 8 (R. 147) was clearly against the uncontroverted testimony that appellant was in compliance with the law, was a resident of Salt Lake
City, registered and voted. The Trial Court found
in Finding No.8 (R. 147):
''The court finds from the evidence presented to it at the trial of the issues involved
herein, that plaintiff was not on May 29, 1951,
or on June 1, 1951, nor had he been for several
years prior thereto, and was not thereafter
during the remainder of 1951, a qualified resident and elector of Salt Lake City, but during all of said time plaintiff was a resident
of Salt Lake County, outside and beyond the
limits and boundaries of Salt Lake City and
so was ineligible to hold office as a police
officer of Salt Lake City."
This is in clear contradiction of appellal.L" s
Exhibit 1 which showed appellant was a registered
voter in 1942, 1944, 1946, 1948 and 1950 and which
was admitted by stipulation of counsel for the respondent (R. 75-76).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It seems equally clear that the Trial Court's
conclusion of law No. 2 (R. 147) "that plaintiff
was lawfully dismissed from the Police Department
of Salt Lake City" based upon the charge that he
was not a resident of Salt Lake City is erroneous
and wholly unsupported by the evidence.
The appellant therefore submits that the judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed and the
respondents and their agents be required and ordered to reinstate appellant to the use and enjoyment
of his office as a police officer of Salt Lake City.
Respectfully submitted,
FRED L. FINLINSON,
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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